THESISxii
A Philosophical Review
Volume 7 • Number 3
April, 2000
Inside this Issue:
Kay Mathiesen
GOD’S PURPOSES AND EVOLUTION
A Reply to Taylor
Jennifer Boyle
AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
William Taylor
AN OBJECTION TO ERIC MOORE’S “MODERATE PERFECTIONISM”
Ellen Machala
THE SELF
Yujin Nagasawa
HAS PHYSICALISM REALLY WON AGAINST DUALISM?
God’s Purposes and Evolution
A Reply to Taylor
Kay Mathiesen
‡ In "Darwinian Evolution and Roger Scruton's Teleological Argument for the Existence of God" (Thesis XII, Volume 7.2) William Taylor argues that Scruton's teleological argument for the existence of God "encounters significant problems in light of Darwinian Evolution"(4). Taylor is surely right that evolution makes such teleological arguments less compelling, since, as Taylor points out, teleological arguments, "fail to explain anything that evolutionary theory does not explain more simply"(5). However, Taylor makes a further claim that I wish to dispute.
Taylor claims that evolution serves to refute teleological arguments, because evolution is inconsistent with the teleology of God's creative acts. Taylor claims that evolution is "in its very nature at odds with any conceivable teleological argument" (4). According to the teleological argument, God creates the universe consistent with a plan and human beings are the "crowning teleological achievement of creation" (4), but evolution produces its outcomes (including human beings) through a "dialectical process," which appears completely unplanned.
Taylor's argument, however, confuses the method by which something is produced with the product itself. Nothing prohibits an agent from producing an outcome via a process, which appears random and unplanned. This is clear once we distinguish epistemological from ontological randomness. Something may appear random to us, because we cannot predict how it will turn out. For instance, according to Chaos Theory, some deterministic (i.e., non-random) systems produce unpredictable results. Due to the complexity of the physical system, there is no faster way to figure out what will happen than to run a simulation. However, the fact that we cannot predict what will occur, does not mean that what occurs is not completely determined by the laws of nature and the initial conditions. Epistemological unpredictability does not imply ontological randomness. And God does not have our epistemological limitations. God, with an infinitely powerful mind and infinite time on His hands, can run an infinite number of simulations and choose that universe (with a set of laws and initial conditions) that produces the results that He prefers. Thus, God could "design" the world by picking the laws of nature, setting the initial conditions and then letting the process spin out in God's chosen -- but apparently unplanned -- way.
Of course, Quantum Mechanics indicates that the universe is not even ontologically deterministic. Even so, God could still use such a system to produce His desired results. Even truly random processes can have certain predictable outcomes. We can predict, for instance, that as we continue to toss a coin the number of heads will approach 50 percent. So, while (contra Einstein) God may "play dice with the universe," He could still predict the large-scale results.
In conclusion, I have not provided reasons to accept the teleological argument for the existence of God. Rather, I have merely shown that the teleological argument is consistent with the theory of evolution. However, as Taylor points out, once one accepts the theory of evolution, Ockam's Razor may require that we dispense with the hypothesis of a creator God.
Kay Mathiesen teaches philosophy at MCLA
Against Capital Punishment
Jennifer Boyle
“The question with which we must deal in not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in light of all information presently available.”
-- Justice Thurgood Marshall
‡ As we approach the dawn of a new millennium, the United States is one of a handful of countries which still executes people. Since 1976, more than 580 people have been executed in the United States, over 50% of those since 1992. President Clinton’s 1994 anti crime bill added 58 more crimes that are punishable by death and his “Anti-Terrorism” bill limits the number of federal appeals for death row prisoners to just one within one year of conviction. Both Republicans and Democrats have created a “get tough on crime” climate which will mean more executions. It is time for concerned Americans and advocates of human rights to take a stand against the barbaric and ineffectual practice of state ordered murder. It is in the best interest of the American people to oppose the death penalty.
Even in today’s booming economy, taxes are still a major issue with Americans. Americans would like to pay less in state and federal taxes. A comprehensive study in North Carolina found that the death penalty costs the state $2.16 million per execution over the costs of a non-death penalty murder case with a sentence of imprisonment for life. On a national basis, these figures translate to an extra cost of over $900 million dollars spent since 1976 on the death penalty. Therefore, it would benefit Americans fiscally if the death penalty were abolished.
No American wants the death of an innocent person on his or her conscience. Since 1973, 83 people have been released from death row with evidence of their innocence. There have also been 23 cases since 1900 where innocent people were executed. Due to advances in DNA research and other technology, the number of innocent defendants released from death row has been steadily increasing over recent years. Between 1973 and 1993, there was an average of 2.5 innocent defendants released. Since then, the average has increased to 4.6 per year. Therefore, it would benefit all Americans, including the innocent Americans currently serving time on death row, if the death penalty were abolished.
With these compelling arguments in mind, it is difficult to understand why anyone would support the death penalty. There are some, however, who would offer up the death penalty as the government’s “last best” deterrent to violent crime. The argument that capital punishment is a deterrent does not stand up under statistical investigation. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the South repeatedly has the highest murder rate. In 1997 it was the only region with a murder rate above that of the national rate. The South accounts for 80% of all executions. The Northeast, which has less than 1% of all executions in the U.S., has the lowest murder rate. A recent study of the deterrence value of the death penalty focused on whether the death penalty deterred the murder of police officers. The researchers surveyed a thirteen-year period of police homicides. The study concluded “we find no consistent evidence that capital punishment influenced police killings during the 1976-1989 period…[P]olice do not appear to have been afforded an added measure of protection against homicide by capital punishment” (Bailey and Peterson, 53, 71).
As further evidence against the “deterrence theory,” some studies indicate that the death penalty actually increases the number of murders. A recent study in California found that the average annual increase in homicides was twice as high during years in which the death penalty was carried out than in years in which no one was executed. Another study of executions in New York from 1907 to 1963 found that on average, homicides increased in the month following an execution.
In summary, the American citizen does not benefit from, and should no longer tolerate, the outrageous costs, moral malignancy, and societal brutalization that result from capital punishment.
Notes
W. Bailey and R. Peterson, “Murder, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence and and Examination of Police Killings.” Journal of Social Issues, 1994.
Jennifer Boyle is a student at MCLA
An Objection to Eric Moore’s “Moderate Perfectionism”
William Taylor
‡ In his “The Case for Unequal Animal Rights” (unpublished manuscript; but see Thesis XII, volume 7.2), Dr. Moore advocates the position he terms “moderate perfectionism,” a view that “recognizes the very real differences between humans and other animals, [while] it also recognizes the inherent value in animals, [and thus,] it does not sanction the terrible treatment of animals that is carried on today” (18). According to his view, these “very real differences” between humans and animals are “[humans’] ability to act morally—their ability to make the world a better place” (11). For this reason, according to his view, in all exceptional life-or-death cases the moral agent’s life is preferred over the animal moral patient’s life. I will attempt to demonstrate that this reason for preferring moral agents in all such cases is problematic, and thus, moderate perfectionism must be rejected.
Consider Moore’s assumption that humans have an ability to make the world a better place. Note that Moore never clearly defines in his paper what is a “better place,” or exactly how human actions can make the world a “better place;” he merely claims that this is a product of humankind’s moral agency.
Consider now the contrasting scenarios of a world consisting only of animal moral patients and devoid of moral agents, as it was before the onset of humankind on Earth, and a world consisting of both animal moral patients and moral agents, as Earth is now -- a world consisting of humans who, despite their unique ability to make moral decisions, frequently kill and pollute (among many other such acts that our moral agency would roundly regard as immoral) for selfish, desire-based gain. Is it plausible that we could argue that the latter world is “better”? It seems instead -- particularly in light of the current status of the world in which we live -- that we could fairly decide that the former world is, in fact, “better.”
It could be argued, though, that this illustration is not an entirely fair objection to Moore’s view. After all, each individual moral agent does not necessarily contribute to these atrocities. Nonetheless, this illustration shows that moral agents are very capable of making immoral decisions, too, and this is a capacity that can clearly make the world a worse place. Moore, however, does not acknowledge this in his paper.
I imagine that a proponent of moderate perfectionism would argue that a moral agent would make the world a better place because his/her beneficial actions are morally motivated, whereas a moral patient’s beneficial actions for the world would be done for reasons that are purely instinctual. And so, since the former is purposeful, it makes the world “better.” It seems, however, that in virtually all significant cases (that is, where humans are utilizing this unique ability), morally motivated beneficial actions are not really making the world better at all, but instead are, at best, attempting to stop, with varying success, the immoral actions of fellow humans that are making the world worse.
Furthermore, it seems that we cannot know a priori that saving the moral agent in all exceptional life or death cases would even have this optimal result. Probably the closest we could come to knowing that saving the moral agent would have this optimal result is to know his/her prior (presumably good) moral track record, but this is by no means a fool-proof method. It seems then that saving the human moral agent in all exceptional life-or-death cases will actually make the world worse-off.
William Taylor is a student at MCLA
The Self
Ellen Machala
‡ David Hume states in “Personal Identity” that the self is just the series of our experiences united by the imagination. According to Hume, humans “are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (122). If people look within, they find that all of their decisions, opinions, and actions are based on their perceptions or the information they have previously gathered. Personal identity is the quality or result of these perceptions. I submit that in spite of a possible objection, Hume’s argument is a reasonable explanation of personal identity.
According to an objection by Thomas Reid, Hume is ignoring the fact that in order to have thoughts and perceptions there must be an actual thinker doing the thinking. Since we also consist of material substance, this individual mind is who we are. We exist as a unique thinker and not as an abstract bundle of thoughts. Without a mind we would have no perceptions.
In response to this objection, I claim that one cannot find when we view ourselves as the thinker. Since all humans can think, then they are just a large group of thinkers. There is no individuality in this case. The way you determine one person’s thinking from another’s is by the individual sets of perceptions. For example, there may be two different people in the same classroom. Both will hear the same lecture and take the same notes. Suppose that these two people have very similar personalities and past lives and seem to agree on everything. It is still impossible for them to have the same perceptions because of the fact that they are sitting in different locations in the room. One person may see the blackboard at a different angle or one may be experiencing a glare from the window. Two people cannot take up the same space at the same time. Thus, they will have different perceptions.
Furthermore, I believe that Hume’s explanation of identity is reasonable because he leaves open the possibility that there may be no constant and unchanging identity of a person. We perceive new things at every moment of every day. If a person is continuously adding new perceptions to his/her identity, then how can the person with the new perception be identical to the person without that new perception? When people change so does their identity. Why, then, do we say that Ellen now is that same as Ellen ten years ago? Although the identity changes, the person still has something that separates here from the others. I am a very different person than I was ten years ago. I have more knowledge, I act and think differently. However, the change in my identity is so gradual that no one considers me to be a completely different entity than I was ten years ago. We unite the changes in our imagination just as we unite our perceptions. What is needed is a new definition of identity that is not restricted by the idea that identity must be a rigid quality that we carry with us everywhere. Instead, identity must be viewed as the collective and changing perceptions relative to one particular entity.
Ellen Machala is a student at MCLA
Has Physicalism Really Won Against Dualism?
Yujin Nagasawa
‡ Philosophers of mind often claim to have overcome Cartesian mind-body dualism. Most subscribe to some kind of physicalism which is consistent with cognitive science and neurophysiology. Even well-known critics of physicalism (like Frank Jackson) now reject dualism.
Cartesian dualism asserts that the mental is not the same as the physical. According to Leibniz's law, if x is identical to y, every property that belongs to x also belongs to y. Descartes maintains that, since we can doubt the existence of our body while we cannot doubt the existence of our mind or soul, the mental and the physical must be entirely distinct. But anti-dualists show the inconsistency of Cartesian dualism by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose, as Descartes says, that we consist of two totally different substances; the physical and the mental. Our bodies are physical, but essentially we are mental beings. If this assumption were true, there would be many inexplicable results: How can my mind control the movement of my arms? How can a physical injury give me pain? It is obvious that two fundamentally different substances cannot causally interact with each other without any connection. Therefore, physicalists say, Cartesian dualism is incorrect. The problem of mental causation is the biggest flaw in Cartesian dualism. No matter how well dualists can explain mental phenomena, dualism cannot be regarded as a well-formed theory of the mind without a successful resolution of this problem.
However, physicalists inherit a different problem: How do our brains give rise to qualitative aspects of our sensations? Mental phenomena are so different from physical phenomena that it seems impossible to explain mental experiences solely in terms of the neural activities in our brain. Descartes’ dualism is definitely obsolete, but if physicalists cannot explain the problem of the qualitative aspect of our mental experiences -- which seems to be as intractable as the problem of mental causation -- it is far from true that they have solved the mind-body problem or that they have totally won against Cartesian dualism.
Yujin Nagasawa is a student at SUNY-Stony Brook
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