Volume 7.1

THESIS_xii

A Philosophical Review

Volume 7 • Number 1

                                     

Inside this Issue:                                                                         

Todd Bowes

DO ABSTRACT ENTITIES EXIST?                                                              

Judith A. Rowe

IS WILE E. COYOTE A BAD INFLUENCE ON CHILDREN?                                                                                                                     

Michael P. Rosenberg

NAGEL’S LAST WORD                                                                                                   

Carol A. Duda

ON FREE WILL                                                                                                                                 

Christina Durkee

ANTHROPOMORPHIZING AND EMPATHY                            

 

Do Abstract Entities Exist?

Todd Bowes

‡ Abstract entities exist as communicative ideas inherent in the non-abstract entities to which they refer.  In order to prove this, or at least provide plausible reasons for it, I will examine theories of nominalism, Platonism, and immanent form. 

Nominalism states that abstract entities such as ideas do not exist except as vocalizations, and that everything in physical reality is a particular, therefore saying that the only things that exist are physical particulars.  This counters the Platonist theory that abstract entities (the forms) exist in a realm of their own, separate from particulars.  However, such a criticism begs the question:  it claims that Platonism is wrong because the forms do not exist as physical particulars; but this alone does not prove that there are no abstract entities.  More to the point, nominalism is flawed in that if physical objects lacked any connecting generality, it would be impossible to speak meaningfully of any sort of identity or relation.  Even if we express abstract entities as vocalizations, at least some of them are vocalizations about actual properties of particulars.  Apparently physical objects require abstract entities.

However, this does not make Platonism true.  In fact, Platonism may merely appeal to ignorance in positing a superior "realm" of intellectable abstract entities. Aristotle’s theory of immanent form seems more credible.  On this view abstract entities exist, but not separate from objects.  They are, on this view, natural aspects of the objects themselves, aspects that make it possible for us to communicate about them.  The fact that there are abstract entities associated with  physical particulars does not eliminate the particularity of their existence which nominalism takes as essential (and even the idea of particularity is an abstract entity!). Our vocalization of abstract entities, then, are inter-subjectively convenient marks for real features abstracted from the world.

Abstract entities are not, therefore, physical things, nor do they exist in a separate realm.  However, the claim that abstract entities are an integral part of every particular object seems more plausible than either denying abstract entities altogether, or giving them a transcendent room of their own.

While it is plausible that the names given to properties associated with physical objects is entirely performed by humans, the fact that those properties exist in the first place seems to come from a source outside of human manipulation.  Inborn abstract properties of physical objects will always remain regardless of the abstract terms and definitions applied to them by humans.  Yet, this idea still does not give any more substance to either nominalism or Platonism, since the inborn abstract entities exist within our perception (i.e.: we know they are there) and exist in our realm and not in another.

Todd Bowes is a student at MCLA

Is Wile E. Coyote a Bad Influence on Children?

Judith A. Rowe

‡ Violence in cartoons teaches children aggressive behavior and desensitizes them to acts of violence.  Children watch and understand television in different ways, depending on the length of their attention span, the way in which they process information, the amount of mental effort they invest, and their own life experiences.  Certain plot elements in portrayals of violence are considered high risk for children.  These elements include characterizations in which the perpetrator is attractive because viewers may identify with such a character, showing violence as being justified, going unpunished, and having minimal consequences to the victim.

Cartoon violence permeates children's programming.  Violence toward animals is rampant in Saturday morning children's programs, where more than one-half of the animals depicted suffer overt physical violence.  These violence-saturated portrayals are not only dangerous to animals, they are also misleading and detrimental to humane attitudes in general.  Most cartoons are constructed with vivid production features, which greatly increases children's predisposition to violence.

 

Researchers have determined the following ways in which a violent cartoon program may impact young viewers:   It can encourage children to learn aggressive behavior and attitudes; it can cultivate fearful and pessimistic attitudes in children about the non-television world; and, it can desensitize children to real-world and fantasy violence.  According to researcher Dr. George Gerbner, many studies have concluded that after watching violence, children are more aggressive.  Also, children who watch violent cartoons are more likely to think of the world as a violent and dangerous place.

It is society's and parents' responsibility to teach children the vast difference between Wile E. Coyote blowing himself up in a Looney Tune and what the real world experiences when violence occurs.  Parents should explain that these characters are drawn and not a character in a costume.  Society may not be able to stop the violence in cartoons and on television, but it can stop the effects of it.  “Even in cartoon violence, we see victims that really don't die," writes clinical psychologist Evelyn Kohan.  “But people do die when they're shot with guns, and people really do die when people hurt them in violent ways.  Our children have to know that." 

It is certainly true that cartoon violence does not account for all the causes of children's aggression.   It is also true that some children are a great deal more likely to be affected by television violence than others, and it is these children who are likely to be potentially more aggressive anyway.  But the effect of cartoon and television violence is to make these “at-risk" children even more aggressive than they would otherwise be.  And although the group especially at risk might be a minority of viewers, they are likely to be the majority of aggressors.  This fact makes them, and the violent content of television, worthy of our attention.  Higher priority must be given to achieving a more realistic and positive representation of animals on television.  Such reform would be a progressive step toward stemming society's 'culture of violence' and its desensitization to the suffering of others.

Judith A. Rowe is a student at MCLA

Nagel’s Last Word

Michael P. Rosenberg

‡ Thomas Nagel's attack on subjectivism is rooted in his view that objective truth is something that cannot be doubted. There are certain elements rooted in logic and language which cannot be escaped -- such as logical truths, and mathematics.  He describes language not as a contingent process, but as logic itself, or a system of concepts to which any language-user must conform. He also claims that language is not thought, but rather is an essential tool of it, and consequentially, logic is a linguistic tool we use to describe our thoughts and engage critically ourselves and others.

As Nagel suggests, when you offer a criticism of someone, what you have offered is an external and a seemingly non-universal point of view.  For this reason, we are inclined to believe that this view, your view, constitutes your own opinion of this other person.  From this, one could conclude that some of our moral, political, and cultural convictions are merely subjective.

However, this view of subjectivism breaks down as we take into account the notion of self-awareness.  The pure externality evaporates when we pose the question, “what are we relying on in ourselves to form that view?”  Nagel claims that these “subjective" convictions are rooted in an inescapable objectivity – inescapable precisely because we cannot understand thought from the outside.  The very concept of subjectivity demands an objective framework in which the subject is located and the special perspective is described.  So your "subjective criticism" of the person was in fact based on premises rooted in objective reason.

Nagel does not deny a system of conventions, nor does he deny that grammar and punctuation require conformity to the linguistic community in an objective sense.  What he does claim is that the validity of those thoughts, those inescapable thoughts that language enables us to express, has its basis in those particular conventions and usages. What is meant by criticism is rooted in convention, while the thought that inspired the premises of the critical sentences is inescapably grounded in objective reason.

The last word in the debate must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are, and such thoughts cannot be regarded as mere "psychological dispositions."  The subjectivist gives the last word to justifications, which end in language.  Nagel gives the last word to the justifications themselves.  The justifications are involved in the recognitions which subordinate them, and are implicated in the process of creating such justifications.  Thus, Nagel gives the last word to objective reason, since it is required to substantiate any subjective thoughts at all.

Michael P. Rosenberg is a student at Brandeis University

On Free Will

Carol A. Duda

‡ We are free to choose regarding things over which we have control.  Therefore, we are able to think independently and to perform some acts absent the control of universal forces.

If humans are predetermined to act as a result of a cause, this cause lifts and erases all sense of responsibility, morality, and ethics.  Blaming our actions on a previous cause can be used as an excuse for inappropriate behavior, laziness, crime, or countless other forms of anti-social actions.  In the words of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “if the complete concept of any being is known and was chosen for existence, then is such a being free in any sense?  If not, then what nonsense is made of the idea of morality or of sin?”

Leibniz defines freedom as something that is not predictable in the same way as, for example, the combination of numbers is predictable.  There is no universal-physical truth governing human action:  “The will has the power to suspend its action with respect to the physical sequence of efficient causes -- but also even with respect to what would otherwise be seen as a decisive final cause.”  Therefore, if by individual free choice we mean individual action that cannot be known in advance by even an infinitely subtle application of the laws of physics, chemistry or biology, then we have free choice in that sense as well.

The materialist Thomas Hobbes objects, however, contending that everything is simply a complicated assortment of moving physical atoms.  He believes the universe is so structured that everything that happens is the result of some prior cause:  in this sense we are not free.  Hobbes also argues that all things, including thought, arise out of the motion of atoms which obey the universal law of physics.  He therefore denies the existence of choice, freedom, or free will.  For Hobbes, free will is only an illusion brought on by processes such as reasoning and deliberating.  Because we are aware of our deliberations, he contends, we merely believe we are making choices that are not the result of any kind of cause.

But consider Immanuel Kant’s view that reality is divisible into two separate spheres – a sphere of appearance which contains all that can be known or experienced, and a sphere of independent reality about which we do not and cannot have knowledge.  Kant allows, therefore, for the possibility of freedom outside the world of experience and scientific causality within this sphere of independent reality.  We can still maintain that minds are the source of action, not anyone or anything else.

Carol A. Duda is a student at Southern Vermont College and  MCLA

Anthropomorphizing and Empathy

Christina Durkee

‡ The relationship between people and their pets never ceases to be amazing.  It can be as profound and complex as any that arise between humans, yet bridging the distance of species adds a fascinating challenge and depth.  It is remarkable to think about how these intense bonds between humans and animals have been forming for millennia and still retain an air of mystery.  How is it that despite all of their differences, animals and humans can form such deep, emotional bonds?  I propose that people need to find commonalties with animals in order to establish a deep, emotional relationship with them, and they do this by identifying animals' behaviors with emotions or motivations to which they can relate.

As the word “relationship” indicates, in order to form an emotional bond, a human needs to be able to relate to the other human or animal.  However, in order to empathize, people need to be able to discern commonalties, to find some sort of common ground or shared realm of experience.  This means that establishing a bond with another, for humans, requires the recognition or identification of something in common between the two parties.

This search for common qualities is apparent in the interaction between people and their pets.  One manner in which people recognize traits in animals is by attributing emotions to behaviors.  For example:  a person observing a pet who responds aggressively to a favorite toy that has become stuck under the couch may comment, “My, aren’t we grumpy today!” thereby attributing an emotional state to the animal.  This by no means denies the presence of emotion in the animal.  Attribution is, by definition, inferring the causes of behavior; therefore, attribution does not necessitate anthropomorphism because the causes inferred may be the true origins of the behavior.  However, inferring the cause of behavior to be a recognizable emotional state allows the human to establish a commonality between him/herself and the animal.

Another way in which people establish a connection, or common ground, with their pets is by attributing a human motivation (other than emotion) to the animal’s actions.  For example:  when a pet is charging after another pet and making threatening noises, a person may explain the behavior in this manner, “He is just getting revenge because she beat up on him yesterday.”  This interpretation attributes revenge, a human motivation, to the animal's behavior.  Whether or not this is the true motivation for the action has comparatively little significance.  While consistent misinterpretation of behavior (for example, that the motivation was the pet’s evil nature rather than revenge) may lead to a future weakening of the relationship by undermining its foundation, it will not hinder its creation.  During the formative process, however, it serves as another point of reference to which the person can relate.

One possible objection is exemplified by human interactions with wolves.  In dealing with wolves, people enter into the hierarchical social structure established by the wolves, and it is their behavior in relation to the pack that determines their rank within the society.  It is the interpretation of the human’s behavior that conforms to the ideals held by the wolves, rather than vice versa as demonstrated above.  Superficially, this example seems to oppose the theory.  In response to this suggestion, however, one must consider the process that is occurring.  From the wolves’ perspective, the human displays expected behavior to which the wolves can relate.  It is possible that they too are using a similar method to provide the foundation necessary to establish an emotional bond.  What is important to note, though, is that as this socialization process takes place, common behaviors and experiences are also being established from the human’s perspective.  This means that the interactions are creating the required human foundation for a relationship, thereby supporting rather than contradicting the theory.

While bridging the distance between species may appear a daunting task, humans and animals take the challenge and triumph.  As we have seen, the process of identifying animals' behaviors with emotions or motivations to which people can relate allows humans to form the connections that foster the deep, emotional bonds we witness between people and their pets.

Christina Durkee is a student at MCLA