THESIS XII
A Philosophical Review
Volume 25 • Number 1
Ó October, 2019
___________________________
INSIDE THIS ISSUE:
Paul Nnodim & Katherine Duval
Closing the Gap on College Accessibility:
Do Racial, Gender, and Socioeconomic Identities Still Matter?
Tessa Sestito
Do you Love Meat?
Brett Belcastro
Games, Ideology, and Détournement
Megan Walsh
Once Upon a Theory of Time at the DMV
Justin Therrien
The Incrementalism of Abolitionism
T. J. Karis
Freedom Isn't Free
_____________________________
Closing the Gap on College Accessibility:
Do Gender, Racial, and Socioeconomic Identities Still Matter?
Do Gender, Racial, and Socioeconomic Identities Still Matter?
Paul Nnodim,
Ph.D. & Katherine Duval
Summary: This paper adopts a Rawlsian theoretical framework to
investigate how group membership shapes the experiences of three demographics
previously barred from higher education on a systemic level: women, people of
color, and people without significant or adequate material means. Rawls’s idea of justice would allow the
government to extend college access to underprivileged or underrepresented
groups proactively, even if doing so constitutes a minimal degree of “inequity”
towards specific demographics. The paper
leverages the results of recent studies on diversity and equity in higher
education to proffer solutions to recurrent problems in the area of college
accessibility.
Group membership, which affects individuals’
identities to varying degrees, influences disproportionately a person’s higher
education prospects. When examined under a Rawlsian system of justice, this
inequality seems arbitrary. In A Theory of Justice (1971), the late Harvard
professor, John Rawls, redefines society as a system of social cooperation, where
equal, cooperating members or citizens share the burdens and benefits arising
from the system. To arrive at such formal equality, Rawls revives the social
contract theory albeit with a phenomenological undercurrent. Members of society
would choose representatives who must immerse themselves in a hypothetical state or original position.
In this state, the representatives put on the “veil of ignorance,” which induces
in them something akin to temporary,
dissociative amnesia. Suddenly, they have no
clue about their particular situations. They no longer know their
political affiliations, economic interests, race, gender and sexual
orientation, position in society, religion, talents, psychological dispositions,
and so forth. However, the representatives in
the original position still have access to one significant information: they represent
diverse interest groups in a functioning democratic society (e.g., The United States) and are in the
original position to choose the principles of justice for their society. Rawls
thinks that in this “original position” of equality, these representatives
would only choose principles of justice that further their rational interest
because no one knows how he or she would fare in real life. The veil of
ignorance and its bracketing effects ensure that the representatives adopt an unadventurous approach towards risk and thus
choose principles that allow the least undesirable conditions for the worst-off
members of society. Rawls (1996) calls principles chosen in this hypothetically
strict condition of equality the “two principles of justice as fairness:”
a. Each
person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic rights and
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be
guaranteed their fair value.
b. Social and economic
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to
positions of
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second,
they are to be to the greatest benefits of the
least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1996, p. 5-6)
The first principle of justice guarantees
an equal amount of liberty for all, while
the second principle has two sections. The first section is referred to as the
“fair equality of opportunity” principle, while the second section is known as
the “difference principle.” Among the second principles of justice, “fair
equality of opportunity” has priority over the “difference principle.” The fair
equality of opportunity principle regulates political offices and job openings
among other things. It ensures that all positions are accessible to all
citizens. Furthermore, it authorizes the government to make sure that employers or administrators of
tertiary institutions meet the requirements of fairness and equality when
advertising job openings or admission offerings. In relation to college access, these two principles of justice
imply that not only must each person have fair opportunity to receive higher
education, regardless of social identity, but also that the institutions
themselves create conditions for the attainment of diversity and equality.
For women, students of color, and students from lower socio-economic status, boundaries to opportunity are real-life phenomena. Although it is worth noting that women have made tremendous progress in not only adapting to the university culture, but excelling in that setting despite historical trends in America that discouraged women from dedicating themselves to academia. Men are steadily becoming a minority on college campuses around the country, with the U.S. Department of Education estimating that 57% of college students will be women by 2026 (Marcus, 2017). Nevertheless, recent statistics reveal that 20-25% of people of all gender identities, but particularly women and gender non-conforming students, remain victims of sexual assault on campuses (Mellins et al., 2017). It is imperative for colleges to ensure that all aspects of the college experience, and indeed all resources at their disposal, are equally accessible to students regardless of gender.
As regards racial parity at institutions of higher learning, a lot more work still needs to be done. Although the enrollment gap between the races is closing, nonetheless, Asian and white students graduate and complete their programs and earn degrees at similar rates (62 percent and 63.2 percent respectively), while Hispanic students and black students graduate and complete degrees at rates of 45.8 percent and 38 percent, respectively (Tate, 2017). It is unsettling that less than half the population of students of color, on average, complete higher education programs. The effects of recruitment campaigns have little impact if retention rates across demographics are abysmal. Aside from the ethical consideration for inclusiveness and broadening opportunities in American education, racial diversity on college campuses contributes to the broader educational environment because meeting and empathizing with people of different backgrounds is an integral part of learning about our shared world. For students of color, representation and inclusion in the campus community are crucial to academic success. Colleges and universities should intensify efforts at recruiting faculty and staff of color and other minorities to represent the percentage of their student bodies that are of minority backgrounds.
Rawls’ notions of equality are also relevant to socio-economic status (SES), which can affect students’ educational paths. According to a CNBC article by Emmie Martin, students attending a public university during the 2017-2018 school year on average pay tuition that has increased by 213% since the 1987-1988 school year. In private institutions, students on average have seen a 129% increase in tuition costs. Collectively, American students are facing 1.4 trillion dollars in student loan debt, the only type of debt that cannot be forgiven (Martin, 2017). For many students today, the decision to continue with higher education hinges on the question of whether or not the economic benefits of a degree will offset the debt of student loan. Although the rising costs of tuition are now affecting most Americans, the economics of college has always been an issue for students from the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
Low SES students often enroll in less-selective institutions with fewer financial resources. This implies that students who are already economically disadvantaged are more likely to attend a school which will have a limited ability to help them meet their financial needs. The most selective institutions must make efforts to balance access for students from different economic backgrounds. A type of affirmative action for low SES students may help to increase admittance of these students. Such a policy shift would require prestigious, private universities to commit sincerely to creating greater economic equality in the enrollment process. These schools must make an effort to admit students from working and middle-class backgrounds, even if doing so requires the more affluent to pay a little more money in tuition or taxes. As Rawls’s difference principle warrants, tolerating some “inequality” may be necessary, if the much talked about social mobility in America is to be realized. As diversity engenders both opportunities and challenges across college campuses in America, cultural and economic identities remain at the front and center of the debate.
For women, students of color, and students from lower socio-economic status, boundaries to opportunity are real-life phenomena. Although it is worth noting that women have made tremendous progress in not only adapting to the university culture, but excelling in that setting despite historical trends in America that discouraged women from dedicating themselves to academia. Men are steadily becoming a minority on college campuses around the country, with the U.S. Department of Education estimating that 57% of college students will be women by 2026 (Marcus, 2017). Nevertheless, recent statistics reveal that 20-25% of people of all gender identities, but particularly women and gender non-conforming students, remain victims of sexual assault on campuses (Mellins et al., 2017). It is imperative for colleges to ensure that all aspects of the college experience, and indeed all resources at their disposal, are equally accessible to students regardless of gender.
As regards racial parity at institutions of higher learning, a lot more work still needs to be done. Although the enrollment gap between the races is closing, nonetheless, Asian and white students graduate and complete their programs and earn degrees at similar rates (62 percent and 63.2 percent respectively), while Hispanic students and black students graduate and complete degrees at rates of 45.8 percent and 38 percent, respectively (Tate, 2017). It is unsettling that less than half the population of students of color, on average, complete higher education programs. The effects of recruitment campaigns have little impact if retention rates across demographics are abysmal. Aside from the ethical consideration for inclusiveness and broadening opportunities in American education, racial diversity on college campuses contributes to the broader educational environment because meeting and empathizing with people of different backgrounds is an integral part of learning about our shared world. For students of color, representation and inclusion in the campus community are crucial to academic success. Colleges and universities should intensify efforts at recruiting faculty and staff of color and other minorities to represent the percentage of their student bodies that are of minority backgrounds.
Rawls’ notions of equality are also relevant to socio-economic status (SES), which can affect students’ educational paths. According to a CNBC article by Emmie Martin, students attending a public university during the 2017-2018 school year on average pay tuition that has increased by 213% since the 1987-1988 school year. In private institutions, students on average have seen a 129% increase in tuition costs. Collectively, American students are facing 1.4 trillion dollars in student loan debt, the only type of debt that cannot be forgiven (Martin, 2017). For many students today, the decision to continue with higher education hinges on the question of whether or not the economic benefits of a degree will offset the debt of student loan. Although the rising costs of tuition are now affecting most Americans, the economics of college has always been an issue for students from the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
Low SES students often enroll in less-selective institutions with fewer financial resources. This implies that students who are already economically disadvantaged are more likely to attend a school which will have a limited ability to help them meet their financial needs. The most selective institutions must make efforts to balance access for students from different economic backgrounds. A type of affirmative action for low SES students may help to increase admittance of these students. Such a policy shift would require prestigious, private universities to commit sincerely to creating greater economic equality in the enrollment process. These schools must make an effort to admit students from working and middle-class backgrounds, even if doing so requires the more affluent to pay a little more money in tuition or taxes. As Rawls’s difference principle warrants, tolerating some “inequality” may be necessary, if the much talked about social mobility in America is to be realized. As diversity engenders both opportunities and challenges across college campuses in America, cultural and economic identities remain at the front and center of the debate.
References
Goldin, C., Katz, L. F., &
Kuziemko, I. (2006). The Homecoming of
American College
Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap. Journal of
Economic
Perspectives, American Economic Association. 20(4), 133-156.
Marcus, Jon. (2017). Why Men Are
the New College Minority. The Atlantic,
Atlantic Media
Company.
Martin, E. (2017). Here’s
How Much More Expensive It Is For You to Go to College than It Was for Your Parents. CNBC. COM. Retrieved from
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/how-much-college-tuition-has-increased-from-1988-to-2018.html
Mellins, C. A. et al. (2017). Sexual Assault Incidents Among
College Undergraduates:
Prevalence and Factors Associated
with Risk. PLOS ONE. 2(11), 1-23.
Retrieved from
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0186471
Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed.
Kelly, E. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory
of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tate, E. (2017). Graduation Rates and Race. Inside Higher Ed.
Paul Nnodim, Ph.D. is a professor in the Department of Philosophy at MCLA; Katherine Duval is a recent MCLA graduate in English/Communications and Philosophy.
_____________________________
Do You Love Meat?
Tessa Sestito
Don’t you love hamburgers?
A nice, medium-rare steak?
Perhaps a chilled glass of milk?
A girl matures,
forced into submission;
Poked and prodded,
chained and exploited,
until her body can give no more to her “farmer.”
A boy ages,
dismembered for packaging.
It wasn’t quick,
nor “humane;”
the poorly trained “farmer” misses,
causing the boy to writhe in agony and suffering.
Do you crave nuggets with dipping sauce?
Or delectable hot wings?
Maybe a crispy eight-piece meal?
Dark and cramped,
with an overpowering odor of suffering
hanging in the air.
At his battered, feeble feet
his fellow passengers,
some with broken wings or legs
others stiff from terminal hemorrhaging,
through the unintentional holes in the crate.
He miraculously reaches the destination
to find a horrendous nightmare awaiting him.
The bodies around him are harvested.
Shackled upside-down,
with a newly broken foot curtesy of a “farmer”,
he struggles,
vomiting and defecating in fear.
Violent screams and frenzied flapping
fall on deaf ears.
Still conscious,
a new “farmer” approaches with a thin blade.
He strikes effortlessly,
slicing the throats of several victims,
still conscious.
I won’t begin to cover
your crispy bacon,
or “free-range” turkey burgers,
because you won’t be able to sleep for days.
It’s time to change this suffering.
To bring justice to such horrendous treatment.
We have the choice.
I chose to follow my moral obligations
and protest the meat industry many of us
contribute to.
How would you feel if you were caged,
exploited,
slaughtered maliciously?
What if your child
was killed for someone else’s dinner?
Do I love meat?
Yes, when it is still attached to the animal
and untouched by humans.
Tessa Sestito is a student at MCLA
____________________________
____________________________
Games, Ideology, and Détournement
Brett Belcastro
Guy Debord observes a political and
economic system that he names “the spectacle.” For Debord, The spectacle
represents an advanced stage of capitalism which operates so automatically, at
such a level of ideological and productive efficiency, that it achieves
independence from the class that created it. The spectacle acts for itself,
advances its own interests, and forms a totalizing political force that masks
the possibility of political change by absorbing and repurposing a society’s
entire media output to its own ends (1).
For Debord, the spectacle lives not
just in the hours that workers expend on labor, but in the hours that they
escape labor through entertainment (2). He writes extensively about new mediums
of entertainment, and the emergence and market dominance of alternative digital
worlds would not seem peculiar to Debord, who predicts it as a matter of
course, as the “separation and reunification as separate” (3) of alienated
workers who seek to escape their work and rediscover the lost community of
their former world.
What Debord might not have foreseen
is the importance of play to these new escapes, or that we would experience
them specifically as games. Debord writes primarily from the 1960s, an era
defined by the mass adoption of television throughout Europe, and while he is
directly concerned with leisure, his theory primarily reflects the ideological
and spectacular function of the passive television screen. But in the 21st
century, the passive consumer appears to have become the active player in a
narrative of their own choosing. Where Debord decries the passivity of all the
information exchanged through screens as a Lacanian “mirror stage,”
infantilizing its audience (4), decades of digital play seem to have revived
the agency that one-way screens managed to erase.
Debord applies a dialectical
approach to demonstrate that the appearance of this consumer transformation
suppresses, but also actually contains, the power to create a political
subject, capable of a historical consciousness. Dialectical approaches
emphasize the conflicts and negations that determine a thing’s essence,
treating the sides of each conflict as a unity of opposites within the whole
essence. While one side of the conflict will dominate at any given time, the
entertainment mediums that Debord writes about contain the ability to both
suppress and express political possibility, depending on which side of the
conflict is strongest.
Contemporary video games are no
exception, and benefit from this dialectical approach. The video game both
promises and mostly suppresses the subjectivization of its players. Unlike a
film, which forms a diegetic world independent of the viewer that will continue
to play even if the audience leaves the theater, few digital worlds exist
beyond the player’s impact on them, responding to the player’s actions but also
demanding and requiring player activity. Indeed, the worlds presented by most
games are actually tightly-scripted corridors that appear wide open and
continuous but are carefully limited in ways expressly hidden from the player:
if the player somehow exceeds the bounds prescribed by the developer, they will
not find a new route, new characters, or new story, but an empty void,
producing a direct contradiction between the freedom which games demand and the
constraints that they require to function. This is the very image of the
consumer society as it currently exists: promise the consumer a narrative life,
demand that they make meaningful choices, but tightly control them within
impassable bounds, and hide this control from them.
Debord, observing the emergence of
these conflicts within the cinema of his time, threw himself into the conflict
and attempted to grasp the contradiction between its powers of ideological
suppression and its ability to meaningfully portray collective action. He
directed and held speaking roles in a number of avant-garde films (5) designed
to break the logic of the spectacle, forcing the audience into conflict with
the screen and arousing their subjectivity. The practical political method of
the Situationist movement that he helped to develop was détournement, to
highlight the material conditions that produce ideological suppression by
diverting or hacking the existing content of the ubiquitous spectacular media,
overpowering and revealing the suppression at its core (6).
Likewise, any game that attempts to
educate the political subjectivity of its players should grasp and portray its
specific contradictions. What this means in practice is to draw attention to
the conflict between restraint and freedom and, wherever possible, to allow the
player to alter or at least criticize the very conditions that make this
conflict necessary. By criticizing and détourning these ideological
productions, players achieve a historical consciousness, and take the first
steps in overcoming alienation and developing political agency.
Sources
(1)
Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. 3rd
Ed. Translated & Pub. Black & Red 1977, Detroit, MI. Thesis 16.
(2) Ibid. Thesis 65.
(3) Ibid. Thesis 29.
(4) Ibid. Thesis 218.
(5)
Debord, Guy. La Société du Spectacle.
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoUIHBSiVAY.
Accessed September 6, 2019.
(6)
Debord, Guy, & Wolman, Gil J, “A User’s Guide to Détournement.” Situationist International Online. URL:
https://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/presitu/usersguide.html.
Brett Belcastro is an alumnus of MCLA currently living in Western MA
_____________________________
Once Upon a Theory of Time at the DMV
Megan Walsh
Richard: “Hey there,
Franklin! How long have you been here?”
Franklin: “Oh, an eternity
I think… I got here around ten and time has been crawling by every since”
Richard: “So you’re saying
time has been moving slower for you than for others since you’ve arrived?”
Franklin: “Not this
again...”
Richard: “You’re the one
who said it”
Franklin: “It’s an
expression, Rich. You know I don’t go for that B-Theory hoopla. It’s the
called the B theory for a reason - its second rate.”
Richard: “Well than explain
to me how you account for the need for expressions like that. Our commonsense
view of the world posits meaningful cognitions to show us the reality of all
points in time. We have memories of the past and can predict with high accuracy
events in the future. How else do you explain that?”
Franklin: “You shouldn’t talk about our commonsense view of the world given
your ideas. Still there are many ways to explain. The spotlight and Growing Block
A-theorists might grant you that there is some reality to things outside
the present. The growing block theorist would say that, while there is no real,
existing future, things in the past do have some objective properties.
Spotlight theorists would go even further and accept a certain reality for both
the past and the future, though they will both be lacking the special state of
the illuminated present. But for me it’s even easier; there is nothing other
than the present. Those memories you mention are a current feature of your mind
as it exists in the present. To remember your breakfast this morning is to
create a thought from concepts that currently exist in your mind. It can’t be
said that a bagel exists when you remember a bagel. When we misremember
something differently than how it was, as we often do, it clearly cannot be
used as proof of the reality of a past which it doesn’t even represent with any
accuracy. So why should other memories? For the future, there is nothing we can
point to within our conceptions that have any realness whatsoever. Events and
objects in the future have yet to happen and therefore have no properties of shape,
color, mass, or anything else that might make something real. And if the entire
state of the future is made up of things which don’t currently exist, the state
itself can’t be said to exist, as it contains nothing.”
Richard: “That’s true; neither one of us subscribes very closely to a common sense view, but perhaps
that’s just an indication that we aren’t common people. I’ve always liked to
think we belong to a rare breed. Either way your defense is hardly a good one.
What is this special illuminating quality composed of for the Spotlight
theorist? And how is the present meaningfully distinguished from the past? For the growing block theory as well, there seems to be nothing in the explanation of
the instances that accounts for how significant the change from present to past
seems to be for objects and events in our lives, yet you clearly feel very
differently about presently being at the DMV than talking about it in the
distant past.”
Franklin: “That’s because
there are significant changes that occur when moving from the present to the
past. An object’s spatial and intrinsic properties are only present for the
object when it is in the present. The pen you are holding, for instance,
occupies a location in space right now and certain properties which make it a pen;
it’s mass, color, ability to write, etc. When it moves into the past, though, it
loses these properties so of course we should feel differently about it.”
Richard: “Then how can you
maintain that objects and events still exist in any sense if they are to be
stripped of their most defining and fundamental characteristics? How can you
say a pen which no longer occupies a location in space, nor any physical
features, not even the properties which constitute “pen-ness,” like the ability
to write, is real or existent?”
Franklin: “I don’t. Some
other A-Theorists may, but my answer to this problem is simple: they don’t
exist. Nothing exists outside of the present.”
Richard: “That’s a handy
way of sidestepping the issue isn’t it? Very well then, let’s examine that view
more closely. If nothing outside of the present exists, how can you reasonably
explain a true event in the past for which there does not currently exist any
evidence? How, for example, could you prove that a caveman, who really lived in
a certain place long ago, but didn’t leave any trace which we can point to in
the world today, was real, if you are committed to saying that there is nothing
besides what we have around us now? It is true, yet there’s nothing you
can point to that makes it necessarily the case.”
Franklin: “Ah, but there
are existing things today which make it necessarily the case. Objects have real
properties of the past within them. If a caveman sat on a boulder then that
boulder today has the backwards-facing property of having been sat on by the
caveman.”
Richard: “I don’t see how
you can call it a real property when there is nothing concrete about it. What
are these backwards-facing properties composed of, and how might we test their
presence within a given object? What’s the difference between the object
really having a true backwards-facing property versus a made up
backwards-facing property, like if I decided to attribute the property of
having been sat on by a unicorn? If it doesn't change the object itself in any
measurable way, how can we say it is a real property belonging to the object
itself?
Franklin: “Richard, some
things can’t be boiled down any further. How can you ask why an object has the
properties it does or ask me to prove it? There is no further explanation
besides the descriptive observation that it is one of the fundamental pieces
that make up that particular object.”
Richard: “Alright I see we
must leave that point at a dissatisfied rest. I must say, I’m still very
unpersuaded by your arguments, and I haven’t even gotten into the problems that arise when judged against our scientific understanding of Einstein's theory of
relativity, which is one of our biggest points of disagreement.”
Franklin: “Well go ahead
then, what’s your view?”
Richard: “It’s based in
Einstein's finding that time can move at different rates relative to one’s own
motion. If I move faster, time for me goes slower. This was measured
objectively with two identical clocks, set to different tracks of motion which
were shown to have experienced time in a measurably different way. So, if we
know that time for me could be moving at a different pace than it is for you,
we must say that my conception of what “now” is may be different as well.
Since my version of now and your version of now are equally valid, we also must
say that every point in time is equally real, as each point could fill the roll
of “now” for someone or something moving at a different pace than us. There is
no one thing which we can call the present, or, for that matter, the past
or future. These sorts of concrete distinctions don’t accurately resemble the
topology of time.”
Franklin: “Okay, so if you posit all time as equally real and states of past,
present, and future as non-objective, how can you distinguish between objects
and events around us now and those which were here years ago? How do you talk
about the past at all?”
Richard: “Relationally.
Clearly there is a difference between a cookie in my hand and a cookie which
has been eaten. I only debate you on the shape of that difference; that it is
not an objective property of the cookie, only an indication of where that
cookie stands in relation to other objects and events. It does not make sense
to say the cookie is ‘in the past’, but it makes perfect sense to say that the
cookie in my hand was before the eaten cookie. There is still a sequence
of events in a certain order.”
Franklin: “We may not see
eye to eye on everything, but I’m not sure I’m willing to accept that our
fundamental perception of the world is so radically different that we aren't
even living in the same time. How can you claim such a thing when our very
civilization rests on the synchronization of our experiences? How do you
suppose we hold a conversation, if time is going at a significantly different
pace for me than for you? Surely one of us would lose their place or become
bored waiting for the other’s reply.”
Richard: “I never made any mention of how different one's relative pace
may be from another’s. Looking around our everyday lives, I’ll admit that
B-Theory seems intuitively false. However, this is only because the
discrepancies between our experiences of time are so infinitesimal for the
speeds of motion we can achieve. We may not be able to pick up on the
differences, but that doesn't mean they aren't there.”
Franklin: “I’m still not
convinced. When I hear the sound of hoof beats I think horse, not zebra, and
when I experience time as so seemingly real and objective, I have to believe it
is so. Commonsense urges me too, and until I have indisputable proof, I must
standby such urges.”
Richard: “Very well. I’ve
just been called up. Enjoy the remainder of your eternity”
References
“Hafele–Keating Experiment - Two Atomic Clocks
Flew Twice around the World, Eastward and Westward. Back at Home, They Each
Showed Different Times.” The Vintage News, 15 Sept. 2016,www.thevintagenews.com/2016/09/16/hafele-keating-experiment-two-atomic-clocks-flew-twice-around-world-eastward-westward-back-home-showed-different-times/.
The Privileged Present: Defending an
‘A-Theory’ of Time. fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/privilegedpresent.pdf.
Megan Walsh is a student at MCLA
_____________________________
The Incrementalism of Abolitionism
Justin Therrien
In environmental policy today, most
advocates for climate change laws demand immediate change. They prefer the
abolitionist approach of having the changes and implementations happen right
here, right now. Others take a different, incrementalist
approach which focuses on gradual steps. Neither must have a
different final goal; they may simply have different views on what is the most
efficient and realistic method of advancing that goal. The view I defend here is that abolitionism is the more efficient method of the two for environmental policy and one, moreover, that ought to satisfy both incrementalists and abolitionists.
Incrementalism’s logic rests on the idea
that it is unrealistic to assume that public policy can be implemented in a
sweeping change; that, in essence, we will spend too much time debating
and editing the bigger plan when it would be more realistic to implement
smaller steps that society could more easily take. However, incrementalism
leaves out a crucial factor: the order in which policies should be implemented. The
incrementalist approach specifies a number of steps to the larger goal, but can be silent on how to go about choosing or prioritizing those steps. In the event that a first step is
considered too harsh or simply voted down, for example, we have lost valuable time in moving toward our eventual goal. These missteps may prove very dangerous, especially in light of recent scientific evidence that we have but 11 years to make significant progress towards our ecological goals.
What is often overlooked is the incremental nature of abolitionist approaches to change. Consider the example of the abolition of slavery in Great Britain in the early to mid-1800s. Two acts were passed; one
in 1807 ending slavery in Great Britain, and one in 1834 ending slavery in the
British colonies in the Carribean (although ignored by some). Two intense acts of abolition in no way marked the end to the slave trade as it
dwindled throughout the nineteenth century (Shapiro). The incrementalism is apparent in the need to continue the process of eradicating slavery. Following the two acts, many people still
illegally traded slaves, while certain colonies simply ignored the order. Over time, the
British were able to bring these to light and completely eradicate the slave
trade by the time their colonies achieved independence. In the background,
Britain also slowly stopped buying products that used
slave-labor (Shapiro).
It follows that abolitionism in environmental policy will also leave room for incremental change. As with the slave
trade, the government will need to continue to investigate businesses and
individuals trying to dodge the laws. However, the regulations would still have
a greater and more efficient effect than if smaller steps were taken. Morally
speaking, abolitionism also promotes a more acceptable approach it does not
continue to commit or promote immoral acts (Francione). Abolitionism is clear in its
goals and can more easily garner popular support, which in turn makes the process more efficient. To bridge the gap
between the two approaches, legislators need to be aware that they are in practice more similar than is typically acknowledged. In the end, what will
likely bridge the gap is the realization that an abolitionist policy can be
enforced, militating against many inclinations to break the law.
References
Levmore,
Saul. “Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism.” SSRN Electronic
Journal, 2010, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1513610.
Shapiro, Stephan.
“After Abolition: Britain and the Slave Trade Since 1807 | Origins: Current
Events in Historical Perspective.” Origins, The Ohio State
University, College of Arts and Sciences, 2019, origins.osu.edu/review/after-abolition-britain-and-slave-trade-1807.
Francione,
Gary L. “Peter Singer: ‘Oh My God, These Vegans…’ .” Animal Rights The
Abolitionist Approach, Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach, 21 Sept.
2015, www.abolitionistapproach.com/peter-singer-oh-my-god-these-vegans/.
Justin Therrien is an alumnus of MCLA
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Freedom Isn't Free
T. J. Karis
“Freedom” is a surprisingly challenging
word to define. In the “land of the free, home of the brave”, it should be
impossible for anyone to misunderstand the term. Yet liberty is a far more
elusive concept than it first appears, even for Americans. Freedom is, after
all, a small word with a very big meaning, and that meaning is not always
consistent between two given persons. The quintessential and most pervasive
definition of freedom, although not always articulated in such detail, is “the
ability to do as one pleases, unconstrained by internal or external influence,
to the extent that it does not interfere with the freedom of others”. Here I
will argue that freedom also requires certain things to maintain itself and maybe
even to exist at all, both of the free individual and of the social structures
within which the individual exists.
To say that freedom requires something
more than the absence of constraints, internal or external, is first and
foremost to cite the necessity of both positive and negative liberty. As the
two are explained in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
In a famous essay first published in 1958, Isaiah
Berlin called these two concepts of liberty negative and positive respectively.
The reason for using these labels is that in the first case liberty seems to be
a mere absence of something (i.e. of obstacles, barriers, constraints or
interference from others), whereas in the second case it seems to require the presence
of something (i.e. of control, self-mastery, self-determination or
self-realization). In Berlin's words, we use the negative concept of liberty in
attempting to answer the question “What is the area within which the subject —
a person or group of persons — is or should be left to do or be what he is able
to do or be, without interference by other persons?”, whereas we use the
positive concept in attempting to answer the question “What, or who, is the
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this
rather than that?” (Carter)
Clearly, both positive and negative
liberty are necessary for a person to be free. Where the usual definition that I
provided in my introduction is focused solely on negative liberty, the
remainder of this essay will focus on certain positive liberties that are
crucial to real freedom.
First, as Richard Schmitt noted in his
essay Socialist Freedom, one’s
desires must be under the control of one’s rational faculties. Bad influences
need not come from outside, he explains: “A drunkard, on the other hand, also
does what he wants but is not free because he cannot stop drinking. Wishes are
often conflicted; one satisfies them but would prefer to resist them. Being
unable to resist, one acts on these desires; one is not free but rather
subservient to desires that will not be refused” (56). So, what one pleases
must not be harmful to that same person. One must know precisely whatever it is
that one truly wants, which is often complicated.
Further still, to be authentically free, one
must not only seek one’s true desires but also be a seeker of the truth; without
a relentless pursuit of objective fact, one will be swayed too easily by
falsehoods and ultimately led astray. If one does not perpetually seek a more precise
understanding of reality, how could one ever hope to be free? A laissez-faire
attitude towards knowledge can only lead to enslavement by the fashions of the
day, without ever bothering to question why things are the way they are. As a
result, one would not be able to make meaningful changes when necessary – or
for that matter, even realize that changes might be necessary in the first
place. Additionally, once one’s beliefs have been set in stone, a lack of
concern for the truth would make these beliefs unlikely to change, even if they
are later proven to be founded upon inaccurate premises.
The truth seeker must then be willing to change
his or her mind in light of superior reason. Without this willingness to accept
one’s own errors and correct one’s beliefs to reflect the highest possible
levels of knowledge and reason, one becomes imprisoned by habits which are only
reinforced further over time. One thus loses the capacity to question one’s own
ideologies and morality. This leads to enslavement of the free-thinking mind by
itself, which can only end in self-destruction. So well-known is this fact that
it has become a cliché of sorts, taking many different forms. David Foster
Wallace, for example, in his infamous “This is Water” speech to the 2005
graduating class of Kenyon College, noted that “the mind is a great servant, but
a terrible master”. Once we have lost control of our ability to escape
preconceptions and convictions that no longer serve us or have been proven
untenable, we have lost a critical freedom.
Yet this does not mean that we should be
willing to give up our long-held ideas and ideals too easily. We must know who
we are and what we believe, and maintain these identities firmly – so long as
we understand why we believe what we do. Although entrapment in erroneous
conviction is dangerous, it is equally perilous to remain indifferent and
passive, allowing the most popular opinions of the day to supplant our own.
Perhaps this is best explained by another cliché: “If you don’t stand for
something, you’ll fall for anything”. In other words, a strong sense of
identity is not just important in relation to truth-seeking, but also because
it keeps one from absentminded conformity. Schmitt addressed this, as well:
Conformists whose identities are
not clearly delineated are inclined to be passive, without firm opinions or
values, incapable of useful thinking, corruptible, full of distrust for self
and other, lonely, and willing to do almost anything to assuage that
loneliness. Due to these incapacities they allow the media, opinion makers,
experts, the majority to shape their opinions for them because they have
difficulties thinking for themselves. Being easily swayed by threats, they
allow their employers or the government to determine their actions. By and by,
they surrender their actual freedom. As a consequence, the word “freedom” means
no more to them than that; if they did want to show some independence of
thought or actions, no one would stand in their way. Then freedom comes to mean
no more than freedom of choice, just in case one ever was inclined to make any
independent choices. That is Berlin’s conception of freedom; the freedom of the
conformists, of persons with indistinct and poorly developed self-identities.
This freedom of choice, in one of its most bizarre permutations, degenerates
into the consumer’s freedom to choose between many different brands of
toothpaste. But freedom that is no more than freedom of choice is – using the
language of de Tocqueville and, earlier, of Rousseau – the freedom of slaves
(63).
Whether from a lack of concern about the truth,
or want of a clear identity, conformism is dangerous at best and lethal at
worst. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for anybody to argue that one
can be a free conformist. It is a contradiction in terms.
Some may now be starting to wonder: what if
there is no such thing as free will at all? Why struggle for freedom if our
very lives are already pre-programmed from the beginning? Of course, any
discussion of the meaning of freedom is inherently a rejection of determinism.
As William James once noted someplace: if you don’t believe in free will, why
bother presenting an argument? Freedom of the will is sometimes referred to as
a ‘necessary fiction’ – and while no one can ever really be certain whether it
is fictitious, for this paper I will assume that it is not. Persons obstinately
convinced of predetermination should not bother to continue reading this essay.
(Unless that is their destiny, of course.) Although I am sure that many compelling
arguments could be made on either side, this is simply not the place for such a
debate. It is not in the cards.
Others still, having accepted the notion of
free will, may wish to argue that freedom does not require any social structure
whatsoever, or even that in fact the absence of social structure is a
prerequisite of true freedom. On a very superficial level, it seems almost
axiomatic that any social institution, which are controlling by their very
nature, would preclude freedom. Yet without some degree of structure, there can
be no society. In fact, social structures, taken collectively, are what define
the word “society”. However ideal it may appear at first, (and certainly it
seems an appealing concept when one is being repressed by an institution – or
even while stuck in line at the RMV), a large human collective without any
organizational structure or institutions, i.e. a “state” of some sort, will
invariably collapse. Before long, power will be taken by brute force by
whomever is quickest and harshest. This is such a simple train of logic that I
will not bother to endeavor explaining this any further. Let us agree for now
that freedom will require a society with some degree of government.
Nonetheless, this government need not be
authoritarian and strict – nor need it hold much power over the governed. In
fact, I would argue that for freedom to flourish, the governed and government
ought to be one and the same, to the greatest degree practicable. Freedom demands
that the social structures which the individual exists within be organized horizontally.
Power corrupts; power must be divided equally and balanced carefully and should
only exist at all where it absolutely must. And regardless of how well power is
balanced and freedom is promoted, every citizen is no less obligated to test
the limits of their freedom regularly, in speech and in action. Otherwise
liberty will rapidly and naturally decay. Says Schmitt,
Freedom requires of us that we not only have
the ability to choose but that we make
choices. We must defend freedom of speech by speaking, and freedom of thought
by thinking. The first defense of democracy is the exercise of one’s democratic
rights and that means to participate as fully as one can in the public
discussions about policy, in the governance of one’s workplace, one’s
neighborhood, city, state, and nation (64).
Through active
participation, it is far less likely that freedom will be furtively dismantled
by the unscrupulous and power-hungry.
Lastly, taking the
wider view, we cannot help but conclude that in any society which concerns
itself with freedom, everyone must be free in order for anyone to be free. This
is made clear even from the most ordinary definitions of freedom. Take, for
example, the simplistic definition provided by John Stuart Mill, “The only
freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs.” By attempting
to deprive another of their liberty, we lose that freedom “which deserves the
name”. Slave owners in fear of slave revolt were just as enslaved as those they
oppressed. Oppressors oppress themselves, too. Freedom only for some, by
definition, means freedom for none. And thus the existence of freedom entails a
never-ending fight for it – for ourselves, and for everybody else, too.
References
Carter, Ian, "Positive and Negative Liberty", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition)
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
.
Schmitt, Richard. "Socialist Freedom." Toward a
New Socialism, edited by Anatole Anton and Richard Schmitt, Lexington Books,
2007, pp. 53-74.
T. J. Karis is a student at MCLA
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