Volume 6.1

THESIS_xii

A Philosophical Newsletter

Volume 6 • Number 1

 1998

                                     

Inside this Issue:                                                                       

Matthew R. Silliman

CRITICAL THINKING AND TRUTH                                                                                        

Katherine Jassen

J. F. POST’S ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM                   

Laurie Swiatek

IN DEFENSE OF SEX EDUCATION                                                             

Peggy Vigiard

ETHICS AND ANIMALS: A DIALOGUE                                    

Critical Thinking and Truth

Matthew R. Silliman

‡ Some students recently raised a question about whether opinions as such could be mistaken (as Descartes says he has found many of his former views to be in error).  I replied by asking whether, since our opinions often change in light of new data on the subject, we don’t implicitly assume that opinions are right or wrong – that they have truth value.  I suggested the example of the opinion that it is raining outside; new evidence, as might be gotten by looking out the window, would easily show the opinion to be either true or false.

The students cleverly countered with an example of an aesthetic opinion, the sort famously resistant to rational disputation.  I conceded that this was a more difficult case to settle, that it presented a much greater epistemological challenge, but that nonetheless most judgments of taste probably do have reasons behind them (psychological, historical, physiological) whether conscious or not, and, therefore, possess as well truth conditions (correct or incorrect ways of characterizing or naming those reasons).  As evidence of this I observed that we often find our first impressions (hating opera) yielding to more nuanced views (liking opera, or being able to appreciate it even if we do not normally seek it out) when we are more educated about a subject, or have come to associate it with other experiences and ideas.  The multiple (and often invisible) reasons for an aesthetic opinion may often be beyond the reach of certain knowledge, but there surely are reasons for tastes.

It struck me during this conversation that students who believe opinions are simply reports on their internal states (rather than claims to be explained and defended) are well-insulated against serious investigation of their views.  That is to say, their ability to think critically, to examine and test their own and each others’ statements for insight or error, adequacy or cant, is severely limited, since they hold a person’s opinions as rightful possessions not subject to reason, like parts of their bodies or wristwatches.  This may help explain the common habit of writing “feel” when what they mean is “think.”  Learning to think critically means stripping away some of the layers of self-protective insulation, a process that is understandably uncomfortable, and even threatening at first.

Reflecting on this phenomenon led me to wonder how some of their teachers, among whom it is fashionable to deny that there is such a thing as truth, can possibly be teaching them to think critically.  How can we ask students to give reasoned accounts of what they think if we deny, in principle and in advance, that one view may be superior to another, one sequence of reasoning more adequate than another?  Of course such claims can be parsed in softer terminology:  one view is merely more complete; a line of reasoning more persuasive, but this only begs the question of our criteria for completeness or persuasiveness.  Like the students’ instinctive defensiveness, it insulates us from having to explain and defend what we really think is true in any direct or perspicuous way.

The American philosopher Charles Peirce famously observed that people normally avoid thinking critically until forced to confront a contradiction in their beliefs; then they exert themselves for only as long as it takes to restore a fixed state of belief, and stop.  What needs explanation, though, is why some of our students exert themselves so vigorously in their efforts to avoid challenging their settled beliefs.  They seem to work harder at not thinking critically than they would have to work if they engaged the texts and their opinions directly.

I suspect part of the answer lies in a sort of inmates’ mentality.  Years of compulsory education have taught many of them deeply defensive habits and attitudes, and the only thing that can displace such habits are potent new habits.  Thus it will help to consider critical thinking not just as a tool for academic purposes, but as a disposition, an entirely new orientation toward both intellectual tasks and daily life that must be cultivated habitually.  The essence of the habit is simple:  ask yourself at every opportunity whether your opinions are true, and why you think so.

Matthew R. Silliman teaches philosophy at MCLA

J. F. Post’s Anti-foundationalism

Katherine Jassen

‡ No statement in John F. Post's recent essay on epistemology is more remarkable than that in his closing argument, in his next to last paragraph, where he says we should consider the laws of noncontradiction and of logic itself to be a posteriori knowledge.  You could blink and miss it; he presents this without flourish or emphasis; it sneaks out of the bushes without the heavy treatment he gives some of his supporting arguments; and he effaces its potential bombshell effect with a final paragraph murmuring of his mild expectations as to its reception.

A modest presentation for a startling proposition, because he is claiming, for realism, that which almost every authority cheerfully yields to idealism.  Nowhere else have I encountered an epistemic system which, if it grants a priori knowledge at all, does not classify “logic,” “mathematics,” and “the law of noncontradiction” as same.  These are considered the very bedrock, the foundation, of the deductive class of thinking.

Post spent a great deal of time early in this essay establishing that there is hidden foundationalism in irrealist thought.  He asked us to consider that this is a flaw, a weakness, a fallacy.  But throughout the body of his essay he did not establish to my satisfaction that this foundationalism was flawed or doomed, and so this argument was beginning to seem to be merely repetitive.  Upon encountering his final argument, now I see that his goal all along was to prepare us for the fact that he would be pulling the rug out from under the irrealists.  That which irrealists assume is their “foundation” (logical structure), Post claims comes only from the world, empirically, a posteriori.  Thus by their own argument, they'd have no access to it.

I find his argument to be secure, at least initially, from irrealist attack.  Irrealists will wish to protest Post's theft (from their “own”' list of approved, a priori, knowledge-sources) of the laws of noncontradiction and logic.  But to do so, they will now have to state how they have unmediated access to such knowledge.  This, Post has explained to us previously, they have never been called on to do.  He showed that most irrealists do not acknowledge the structural foundationalism of their arguments; an exception is Plantinga (quoted on p. 248):  "We cannot so much as raise the question of the reliability of reason!"  In a tug-of-war between Post and irrealists, Post claims access to knowledge of logic through empirical, inductive, and abductive means, and the irrealists claim what?  That "we just know," perhaps; and that the "we" (who know these things) "...are in charge"? (p. 264).

So, though Post's claim for knowledge of logic seems startlingly novel, in overturning an assumption previously shared by both sides, fortunately for him its vulnerability lies in that area which irrealists cannot reach.  They cannot successfully attack Post's worldly claim, since they cannot enter or use the world at all.  Further, they are equally vulnerable due to the novelty of having to defend their own claim; they are unprepared.  Any 'mere' claim for themselves seems weak.  Irrealists would thus lose such a tug-of-war.  They have only one valid objection to his theft, which is that when logic was considered theirs, it was considered a sure thing (deductive, necessary) whereas his claim is not even sure on his own account, but merely probabilistic, inductive, descriptive.  This point, while valid, disturbs only them and not Post, so it gains them no ground.

References

J. F. Post. “Epistemology.” In D. Weissman, Ed. Descartes.

Katherine Jassen is a student at MCLA

In Defense of Sex Education

Laurie Swiatek

‡ Public schools must offer comprehensive sex education courses beginning in grade school and continuing throughout high school if they are to fulfill their mission of assisting children and adolescents in achieving autonomy as healthy human beings.

Most states mandate sex education courses as part of the formal school curriculum;  however, studies have revealed that most of these programs are inadequate. While a majority of parents approve of sex education for their children, a small, often right-wing, highly vocal minority has opposed sex education and attempted to influence local school districts, which have in turn responded by watering down programs to cover only the most cursory, "safe" topics.

Research shows that children who receive comprehensive sex education benefit in a number of ways.  Students benefit from a deeper understanding of their human sexuality which results in deeper self-understanding.  The shame that often accompanies any sexual discussion or activity, a product of our long, theologically-oriented heritage which equates sex with sin, has been shown frequently to result in sexual dysfunction later in life.  Through education, however, many individuals become empowered to examine, understand, and evolve their operative beliefs, resulting in their greater emotional and psychological health.

Most children do not receive sex education at home.  While some parents may feel comfortable and capable of discussing certain topics within the field of human sexuality with their children, most feel ill-equipped to deliver broad-based instruction, and often lack much of the requisite knowledge to do so.  In the absence of formal education, children seek information, often inaccurate, from either their friends or through their own experimentation.  Furthermore, education is a proven factor in reducing high-risk sexual activity and behaviors among adolescents; and because some sexually transmitted diseases are life-threatening, instruction in their prevention is an absolute imperative for our schools.

The United States has the highest teen pregnancy rate in the industrialized world (though the actual levels of sexual activity in our country are no higher than in other nations).  Clearly, there is a need for a more effective use of contraception among American teens; and, in fact, research shows that sex education is one of the most effective means of reducing the teen pregnancy rate.  Educated teens are more likely to discuss openly and consider contraception methods prior to engaging in sexual activity.  Broad-based education in human sexuality has been found to enhance communication not only between teens and their partners, but between teens and their parents as well.

Research reveals an additional social benefit of comprehensive sex education:  homophobic attitudes are greatly reduced by teaching children that what is considered "natural" sexual behavior, is in fact, relative to tradition or convention, both within our culture and worldwide.  Because every school serves a homosexual population of students, most of whom are often ostracized and scorned by their peers (and sometimes even by their families), schools should be legally and morally compelled to provide accurate information to all students.  Only by promoting such an understanding will we realize our goals of greater social cohesion and inclusivity, both within the school setting, and in our communities at large.

One might counter that the study of human sexuality within the school setting might be interpreted by students as a sanctioning of sexual activity.  Yet, research shows that there are no data to support this claim; sex education leads neither to earlier sexual activity, nor to experimentation among adolescents.  Some research has indicated, to the contrary, that educated teens are more likely to postpone their sexual debut.  In short, because broadly focused sex education for adolescents promotes physical and psychological, as well as social, well-being, it should be a part of every school curriculum throughout America. 

References

Crooks, Robert and Baur, Karla.  Our Sexuality.  California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1996.

Harbeck, Karen M.  Coming Out of the Classroom Closet.  New York: Haworth Press Inc., 1992.

Hockenberry-Eaton, Marilyn; Richman, Mary Jane; DiIorio, Colleen; Rivero, Theresa. "Mother and Adolescent Knowledge of Sexual Development: The Effects of Gender, Age, and Sexual Experience." Adolescence 31 (Spring 1996): 35-47.

Laurie Swiatek is a student at MCLA

Ethics and Animals

A Dialogue

Peggy Vigiard

‡ [The following is a fictional dialogue between philosopher (and animal liberationist) Peter Singer and an advocate of human-centered ethics. – Ed.]

Peter Singer:  Those who would support cruel treatment of nonhuman animals by eating meat and using products developed through animal experimentation are guilty of speciesism – the general view that human animals, as a species, have greater moral worth than nonhuman animals.  Speciesism is comparable to other forms of prejudice, like racism and sexism.

Advocate:  Morality is a human institution that is maintained (by humans) for our own purposes and our own social good.  Because kindness and compassion contribute to the human good, we should not inflict needless suffering on nonhuman animals.  However, we are not obligated to promote the good  of nonhuman animals at our own expense.  This would run counter to the whole purpose of morality.  As for speciesism being as bad as racism or sexism – that is just not true.  The difference between black and white is only a matter of race, just as the difference between men and women is simply a matter of sex.  The difference between human and nonhuman animals is not simply a matter of species.

Peter Singer:  It is the similarities, not the obvious differences, that are important:  because there are some nonhuman animals that care about their interests as much as we care about our own, we should consider the interests of these nonhuman animals to be just as important as ours, and respect their interests as we would want ours to be respected.

Advocate:  Your golden rule theory makes no sense because we cannot expect nonhuman animals to treat us the same way we treat them.  They can only act in a manner that is consistent with what they are – nonhuman animals.

Peter Singer:  Nonhuman animals cannot apply the golden rule to us because they are not moral agents.  But we are moral agents and we know the difference between right and wrong.  Just because the interests and goals of nonhuman animals are not always the same as ours, we are not entitled to assume that they are any less important.  Nonhuman animals can experience pain and pleasure just as human animals can.  If it is wrong to cause human suffering without good reason, then it is also wrong to cause unnecessary pain and suffering in the case of nonhuman animals.  The pain that nonhumans experience is of equal moral importance as the pain humans experience.

Advocate:  Some pain is necessary if it is needed to serve our own interests, such as those involving medical research on nonhuman animals.  Also, most people enjoy eating meat and, although it is not necessary, it is a important human interest.

Peter Singer:  I agree some animal pain is necessary to serve important human interests, but eating meat certainly is not one of them.  In fact, a lot of research conducted on nonhuman animals is trivial and unnecessary.  The truth is that most humans are speciesists when it comes to deciding when it is appropriate to kill other beings.  To avoid speciesism, we must believe that beings which are similar in all morally important respects have a similar right to life, and that being a member of our own biological species cannot morally be a condition on which this right is based.  There are certainly nonhuman animals whose lives are more valuable than the lives of some humans.  For example, a normal adult pig or a dog will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant.  If we base the right to life on these characteristics we must grant these animals a right to life as good or better than the retarded infant.

Advocate:  If we accept this argument, then it could also follow that killing dogs or pigs because of their age or level of suffering would be a moral offense because of their right to life, and severely retarded or handicapped humans could be killed for trivial reasons because they have no right to life.

Peter Singer:  Even though most of the time a human life is considered more important than the life of a nonhuman animal, there are some instances when it may not be so.  If we are ever in a situation where we must choose between a human and a nonhuman life (or want to justify any sort of killing), our decision should be based on the characteristics of the individuals involved, not their species.

Peggy Vigiard is a student at MCLA